Modern-world robotics involves complex environments where multiple autonomous agents must interact with each other and other humans. This necessitates advanced interactive multi-agent motion planning techniques. Generalized Nash equilibrium(GNE), a solution concept in constrained game theory, provides a mathematical model to predict the outcome of interactive motion planning, where each agent needs to account for other agents in the environment. However, in practice, multiple local GNEs may exist. Finding a single GNE itself is complex as it requires solving coupled constrained optimal control problems. Furthermore, finding all such local GNEs requires exploring the solution space of GNEs, which is a challenging task. This work proposes the MultiNash-PF framework to efficiently compute multiple local GNEs in constrained trajectory games. Potential games are a class of games for which a local GNE of a trajectory game can be found by solving a single constrained optimal control problem. We propose MultiNash-PF that integrates the potential game approach with implicit particle filtering, a sample-efficient method for non-convex trajectory optimization. We first formulate the underlying game as a constrained potential game and then utilize the implicit particle filtering to identify the coarse estimates of multiple local minimizers of the game's potential function. MultiNash-PF then refines these estimates with optimization solvers, obtaining different local GNEs. We show through numerical simulations that MultiNash-PF reduces computation time by up to 50\% compared to a baseline approach.

We consider the multi-agent spatial navigation problem of computing the socially optimal order of play, i.e., the sequence in which the agents commit to their decisions, and its associated equilibrium in an N-player Stackelberg trajectory game. We model this problem as a mixed-integer optimization problem over the space of all possible Stackelberg games associated with the order of play's permutations. To solve the problem, we introduce Branch and Play (B&P), an efficient and exact algorithm that provably converges to a socially optimal order of play and its Stackelberg equilibrium. As a subroutine for B&P, we employ and extend sequential trajectory planning, i.e., a popular multi-agent control approach, to scalably compute valid local Stackelberg equilibria for any given order of play. We demonstrate the practical utility of B&P to coordinate air traffic control, swarm formation, and delivery vehicle fleets. We find that B&P consistently outperforms various baselines, and computes the socially optimal equilibrium.

Game-theoretic inverse learning is the problem of inferring the players' objectives from their actions. We formulate an inverse learning problem in a Stackelberg game between a leader and a follower, where each player's action is the trajectory of a dynamical system. We propose an active inverse learning method for the leader to infer which hypothesis among a finite set of candidates describes the follower's objective function. Instead of using passively observed trajectories like existing methods, the proposed method actively maximizes the differences in the follower's trajectories under different hypotheses to accelerate the leader's inference. We demonstrate the proposed method in a receding-horizon repeated trajectory game. Compared with uniformly random inputs, the leader inputs provided by the proposed method accelerate the convergence of the probability of different hypotheses conditioned on the follower's trajectory by orders of magnitude.